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The international hype surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) and its implications for the South Asian security 
complex* has caught the attention of India’s strategic community.  The 
country’s reaction can ultimately change the dynamic of the troubled 
trilateral relationship – but so far the domestic debate has yet to gain 
traction. The CPEC – while not an integral part of the major Chinese 
connectivity project called ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) which is set 
to become one of the legacies of the current Chinese leadership under 
President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang – is both a potential hub 
for two components of the OBOR, the Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and an additional strategic 
access route to the Indian Ocean in its own right. As China, with the 
realization of this corridor from Kashgar in Xinjiang Province to 
Gwadar Port in Baluchistan, seeks to set up an alternative artery for its 
trade and energy supply. 
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*   For more on this issue please see: Buzan, Barry, und Ole Wæver. 2012. Regions and 
Powers : The Structure of International Security. Vo. 91. Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 COMMENT
Even though its feasibility and economic value is somewhat doubtful due to harsh weather 
conditions (the Khunjerab Pass and much of the Karakoram Highway is shut down in winter), 
local resistance and corruption as well as disrupting terrorism, only China is considered 
capable to implement such a mammoth project. Another important aspect of the CPEC is the 
further deepening of the China-Pakistan relationship, which would strengthen Pakistan 
strategically and possibly economically. The intended $46 billion investment accounts for 
twice the amount spent by the United States since 2002. However, the expected geo-strategic 
enhancement of Pakistan combined with China’s growing role in South Asia has not gone 
unnoticed in New Delhi. Since 2013, even under the UPA government India has lodged 
protests against the implementation of the corridor. Both Prime Minister Modi and his Foreign 
Secretary Sushma Swaraj have called the project unacceptable for India. In general, official 
India’s stance so far has been to reject the CPEC due to the inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistan into 
the economic corridor, which in Indian terminology is part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir 
(PoK). Furthermore, Chinese statements that referred to the territory as a part of Pakistan – in 
contrast to its previously neutral position on Kashmir’s status – have upset the Indian side. 
Besides this focus on territoriality, India has yet to comprehensively articulate its approach. 
The strategic community and the informed public, however, have taken a broader perspective 
as there are basically two competing positions in the ring now; one a hawkish and more 
Realist one and another more accommodationist, Liberal one. The hawks (cross-cutting party 
allegiances from Congress Nehruvians to Hindu nationalists and reflecting IR as well as 
domestic cleavages) argue that the CPEC should be regarded as a strategic game changer with 
potential military-strategic ramifications. For them this new level of China-Pakistan 
cooperation should be met with upgrading India’s military capabilities especially by 
expanding its blue-water navy to effectively limit China’s access to the Indian Ocean. 
Furthermore, India should renew its decades-long efforts to uphold strategic unity with other 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries to balance both 
China’s OBOR-project and its more assertive interpretation as a ‘String of Pearls’ approach to 
secure choke points and major sea lines in the Indian Ocean. So according to the Realist 
perspective India should use all instruments at a state’s disposal like the alleged attempts by 
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to sabotage the CPEC by fomenting resistance on the 
ground. As India cannot yet compete with China on a one-to-one basis economically in the 
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius or Myanmar it should nonetheless devise a Grand Strategy for 
the Indian Ocean region and South Asia comprehensively and coordinate its policies with 
other nations ranging from the United States and Japan to Russia and Iran. 
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The other perspective with proponents like Raja Mohan has a more accommodationist view, 
Bajpai calls them ‘Neoliberals’, and regards China’s initiative of regional economic corridors 
as a potential opportunity for India as it would curb terrorism and stabilize Pakistan by 
triggering an economic boom. Basically a two-track strategy is propagated based on the 
recognition that in China’s perception India is just a minor competitor. More importantly since 
China had been granted an SAARC observer status in 2005 the country’s posture, as ‘the 
elephant in the room’ in South Asia cannot be reversed in the short term. Therefore these 
‘Liberal Globalists’ propose to engage China in various ways; be it in the so called ‘all 
weather’ strategic-dialogue with respective redlines concerning China’s support of Pakistan 
(Afghanistan, submarines); be it in a complete turnaround in India’s policy on territory and 
borders by proposing an inclusion of India, Iran and Afghanistan into the CPEC-project. An 
additional suggestion is to link the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic corridor 
(BCIM-EC) with the CPEC so that economic corridors are not built around but with India. 
China, however, has already threatened to sideline India in the BCIM-EC framework if the 
country is resisting its evolving new Asian order on other fronts. But still Liberals point to the 
mutually beneficial relations regarding the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB) or the 
BRICS-led New Development bank where a constructive engagement with China has been 
possible. 
Besides engagement the proposed Liberal strategy would rest upon internal balancing; 
meaning a continuing emphasis on domestic economic growth plus the implementation of 
SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Agreement) and the pursuit of independent, strategically 
crucial, projects like: ‘Mausam’ or the ‘Spice’ and ‘Cotton Route’ projects focusing on the 
wider Indian Ocean region or implementing the announced ‘North-South Corridor’ with 
Russia (that has huge infrastructure schemes of its own) and Iran (with its ports of Chabahar 
and Bandar Abbas) as well as the transformation of the ‘Look East’ into a proper ‘Act East’ 
policy. Prime Minister Modi has put all these initiatives on the agenda recently and China has 
reacted by offering to look for synergies with these Indian plans. How India’s policy will 
actually evolve remains to be seen; so far India has not been successful in fending off China’s 
intrusion into South Asia. Even if India is adopting a mix between Realist and Liberalist 
policy prescriptions I would argue that only the country’s integration into the CPEC project 
qualifies as a real strategic game changer.                 
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